FIU Law Review
Volume 9

Number 1

Article 30

Fall 2013

Can a City Declare that All Pickup Trucks Are Legally Ugly? A
Florida Case Tests the Limits of Aesthetic Regulation
Scott Andron

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Other Law Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Scott Andron, Can a City Declare that All Pickup Trucks Are Legally Ugly? A Florida Case Tests the Limits
of Aesthetic Regulation, 9 FIU L. Rev. 83 (2013).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.9.1.30

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

28 ANDRON_PUBLISHER2 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/13/2014 8:28 PM

Can a City Declare that All Pickup Trucks
Are Legally Ugly? A Florida Case Tests the Limits
of Aesthetic Regulation
Scott Andron*
INTRODUCTION
The best-selling car in America isn’t a car at all; it’s a pickup truck. In
October 2012, for example, Ford sold more than 56,000 F-series pickups, or
nearly twice as many units as the Toyota Camry, the top-selling passenger
vehicle without an open cargo bed in the back.1
America has a love affair with the pickup truck. The City of Coral
Gables, however, does not. Rather, what this South Florida municipality
had, up until recently, was an unusual ordinance that prohibits parking of
pickup trucks on city streets between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.2 Unlike most
similar rules, this ordinance covered not only commercial vehicles marked
with the name of a business, but also private trucks with no markings or
special attachments.3 Also, pickups were prohibited not only on public
streets but also in private driveways.4 The only place a pickup truck could
be stored at night in the city was in a garage.5
Lowell Kuvin didn’t have a garage, so he parked his F-150 in front of
his Coral Gables home, and the city fined him $50.6 Kuvin sued the city in
2003, challenging the constitutionality of the pick-up truck ban. A panel of
Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal overturned the regulation as
applied to Kuvin’s pickup truck,7 but after an en banc rehearing, the full
court upheld the city ordinance as rationally related to the city’s interest in
maintaining an attractive community,8 and the state Supreme Court denied

*
J.D. Candidate, Florida International University, May 2014. The writer also is a journalist and
has written extensively about land-use issues for newspapers in Florida, North Carolina and
Pennsylvania.
1 Auto Sales, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2012).
2 CORAL GABLES, FLA., ZONING CODE §§ 8-11 and 8-12 (2003). Later renumbered to §§ 4-411
and 4-412.
3 Id.
4 Id. at §§ 8-11.
5 Id.
6 Idy Fernandez, Truck Owners Riled Over Ban, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 2003, at 1E.
7 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 604, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
8 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 625, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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certiorari.9
The Kuvin case illustrates the extreme breadth of the municipal power
to regulate aesthetics. In most cases, municipal appearance rules are subject
only to rational-basis review, “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial
scrutiny” in equal protection claims.10 Unless fundamental rights or suspect
classes are implicated,11 the only limitation is that the regulation’s
connection to a legitimate governmental purpose must not be “so attenuated
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”12 But courts seldom
strike down aesthetic regulations on this basis.13
The Kuvin case also illustrates an interesting tension between two
competing policy considerations: the perceived right to be free, especially
in one’s own home, from gratuitous government meddling in private
lifestyle or economic choices, against the right of communities to choose
elected officials who can respond as they see fit to their constituents’
wishes without gratuitous meddling from judges.14
These policy concerns divide not only judges, but also the Coral
Gables community. In a November 2012 referendum, the ordinance was
repealed by a vote of 57 to 43%.15 Under the new rule, pickups are allowed
provided they have no commercial markings or attachments and the beds
are empty.16
This paper will review the history of local aesthetic regulations with an
emphasis on Florida, before analyzing the competing views of the judges in
9

Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 64 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 2011).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 20 (1989).
11 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (holding that a ban on most signs
in residential neighborhoods violates the First Amendment despite substantial state interest in
aesthetics); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (holding that a city must treat
similarly situated landowners similarly to avoid an equal protection claim). Also, a regulation must
comply with Fifth Amendment limitations to avoid becoming a regulatory taking. For example, a
regulation may not be so burdensome as to deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his
land. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (holding that a regulation may not be
so burdensome as to deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land.).
12 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
13 This point will be discussed throughout this paper, but illustrative cases include: Joel v. City of
Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that ordinance prohibiting homeless people
from sleeping outdoors is rationally related to aesthetics); Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 922
(11th Cir. 1995) (finding ban on houseboats in some areas of city is rationally related to aesthetics).
14 As the trial judge put it: “This case involves the difficult task of balancing two competing
interests: on the one hand, a community’s right to enact ordinances which promote and protect aesthetic
considerations, and on the other hand, a citizen’s right to enjoy his property in the manner in which he or
she desires to.” Order on Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, No. 0308911-CA-24 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005) (No. 23971-1588).
15 Howard Cohen, It’s Official: Pickup Trucks are Legal in Coral Gables at Night, MIAMI
HERALD (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/11/09/3089815_its-official-pickup-trucksare.html.
16 Id.
10
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Kuvin and considering other analyses they might have used. Based on the
facts and arguments before them, the judges had little option but to uphold
the Coral Gables ordinance, but this paper will argue that plaintiff Kuvin
missed or failed to develop some strong arguments that might have changed
the outcome. In the alternative, this paper will discuss changes in law that
might limit state power over aesthetics.
Throughout this paper, a theme will appear repeatedly because it lies at
the heart of the Kuvin case and rational-basis cases generally: Legislatures
aren’t precluded from passing silly laws, only irrational ones. And when
reasonable people can disagree about whether a law is crazy, it isn’t.
The question is whether there was any way for Lowell Kuvin to get
around this principle – and, if not, whether there should have been.
LAND USE AND AESTHETICS UNDER THE POLICE POWER
A wide range of municipal zoning and land-use regulations have been
upheld based on their rational relationship to a substantial government
interest in aesthetics. This power over aesthetics may be seen as a specific
case of the general holding of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,17 that
exclusion of some uses of land via zoning is a valid exercise of the police
power. The Euclid Court prescribed what amounts to a rational-basis test to
determine the validity of a land-use regulation: “If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”18
This principle was expressly extended to aesthetics in Berman v.
Parker,19 which found that zoning for aesthetic purposes is a valid exercise
of the police power. In an oft-cited passage of the opinion, Justice Douglas
wrote:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present
case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.20
17
18
19
20

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Id. at 33.
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Allowing aesthetic regulations under the police power marked a major
shift in the law. For example, just two decades before Berman, a New
Jersey appeals court struck down a limitation on billboards, declaring that
“[a]esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than
of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power to take private property without compensation.”21 Later
decisions began to allow aesthetics-based regulations provided that another
public purpose was also served, but the modern rule in most states is that
aesthetics alone are a sufficient basis for land-use regulation.22
Since Berman, numerous other types of aesthetic regulations have
been upheld. Some examples include architectural regulations,23 billboard
bans,24 historic regulations,25 and restrictions on vehicles.26
Acceptance of regulations based purely on aesthetics has not been
consistent across states, however. Berman acknowledged a state power to
regulate for aesthetic purposes, but states have sometimes chosen to place
their own limitations on this power.27 For example, some states have
imposed a balancing test, requiring courts to weigh the regulation’s benefits
to the public against the harm to the property owner.28 Other states stick to
the old rule, that aesthetics alone are insufficient to justify use of the police
power.29 But in most jurisdictions, aesthetics alone are sufficient to support

21 City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J.
1905) (cited in 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:3
(4th ed. 2012)).
22 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:4 (4th
ed. 2012).
23 E.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review of Cleveland Heights, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio 1963)
(upholding decision of municipal board of architects, who rejected plaintiff’s proposed modern-style
concrete-and-glass home in a neighborhood full of colonials).
24 E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a municipality may ban billboards on aesthetic grounds, provided that it does not allow so many
exceptions as to eviscerate the ban’s content-neutrality); City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver. Ass’n of
Lakeland, 414 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1982) (“Cities have the authority to take steps to minimize sight
pollution . . . .”).
25 E.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 18 (N.M. 1964) (upholding city
regulation of the size of window panes to conform with ‘Old Santa Fe Style’ of architecture in historic
district).
26 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 83:37
(4th ed. 2012). Many specific cases are discussed in this paper, infra.
27
For a more complete discussion of this point, see id. at § 16:6 (4th ed. 2012).
28 E.g., State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 681 (N.C. 1982); Chusud Realty Corp. v. Vill. of
Kensington, 243 N.Y.S.2d 149, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (“On balance, the court deems this a case ‘in which
the legislative body goes too far in the name of aesthetics.’”) aff’d, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 (App. Div. 1964).
29 E.g., Heck v. Z.H.B. for Harveys Lake Boro., 397 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979)
(“[a]esthetics alone cannot support a determination that the general welfare of a community would be
adversely affected by the granting of a special exception.”).
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land-use regulations.30
Florida was an early adopter of land-use regulation as permitted by
Euclid, and the state’s courts actually recognized aesthetics as a legitimate
government interest before Berman. In City of Miami Beach v. Ocean &
Inland Co., the Florida Supreme Court noted Euclid’s “fairly debatable”
standard, and upheld land-use restrictions in a city zoning ordinance based
on aesthetics, at least for a beachfront community with a tourism-based
economy.31 Later cases extended the rule to other beachfront cities,32 but by
the early 1980s, the state’s courts were no longer stating any such
limitation.33
In Florida, Coral Gables is known for its strict land-use regulations.
The community’s nickname is “The City Beautiful,” and its website is
citybeautiful.net. Humor writer Dave Barry lives in Coral Gables and once
described it as “a grit-free community that keeps property values up by
making pretty much everything illegal. You get fined for painting your
house a non-approved color; if you left a tire in your yard, you’d get the
death penalty.”34 The city has a number of reported land-use cases to its
credit, including Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan,35 in which the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a complex set of regulations governing the size,
shape, color, placement and other features permitted on newspaper racks
within the city limits. Back in the 1970s, the city also successfully
defended a rule prohibiting the parking of trailers in residential
neighborhoods.36
Land-use regulations commonly include limitations or outright bans on
storage of certain types of vehicles in residential districts. Typically,

30 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:5 (4th
ed.) (includes list of states with cases adopting this rule).
31 City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941). The court reaffirmed
the principle in City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681, 684 (Fla. 1949) (“[T]he peculiar
characteristics and qualities of the City of Miami Beach justify zoning to perpetuate its aesthetic appeal,
and that this is an exercise of the police power in the protection of public welfare.”).
32 E.g., Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 615 (Fla. 1960) (“We agree that the City
of Sarasota is reasonably placed in the same category as Miami Beach so far as its appeal on the ground
of attractiveness is concerned.”); Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782, 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) (upholding zoning rule against junkyard because the “City of Fort Pierce is no less an
attraction to tourists for its aesthetic qualities than the cities of Miami Beach and Sarasota”).
33 Campbell v. Monroe Cnty., 426 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“We agree that a
Florida county may enforce zoning requirements which primarily regulate aesthetic appearances.”); City
of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver. Ass’n of Lakeland, 414 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 1982) (holding that
“aesthetics alone” are sufficient justification for billboard regulations).
34 Dave Barry, Did Somebody Smell a Rat?, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 13, 2011),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/12/2062066/dave-barry-did-somebody-smell.html.
35 Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 931 (1995).
36 City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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prohibited vehicles include vehicles that cannot move under their own
power, trailers, recreational vehicles, boats, vehicles with more than two
axles, and commercial vehicles, which are typically defined as those
marked with a company name and other lettering, or those with special
attachments such as tow trucks.37 Such regulations are generally upheld.38
But few reported cases specifically address pickup trucks. In Kuvin,
the trial court relied on Coral Gables v. Wood, which dealt with campers,
but was binding authority in the Miami area’s state appellate court district.39
Nevertheless, the trial court noted that judges elsewhere had reached
different conclusions.40 For example, in Proctor v. City of Coral Springs,41
an appellate court in a neighboring district found that a law prohibiting
parking of trucks on residential property was
[u]nreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to pickup trucks. It
restricts drivers of pickup trucks from visiting with friends or family
by making it illegal to be parked in a residential driveway, or on the
hosts’ lawn, or in the street in front of the home after 9:00 p.m. even
though the vehicle in question is not truly a commercial vehicle; i.e.,
without commercial markings of any nature and not used for
commercial purposes.42
The court’s rationale was somewhat confusing. On the one hand, the

37 An example of a relatively permissive ordinance is Section 33-124.1 of the Miami-Dade
County Code of Ordinances, which allows homeowners to park up to two taxicabs, limousines, or
commercially marked vehicles in a residential neighborhood without restriction. One of these vehicles
may be a truck equipped with ladders or other equipment, provided that it is concealed behind an opaque
fence, in a garage, or behind the house. An example of a more restrictive ordinance is Section 25-43 of
the City of Plantation, Fla., Code of Ordinances, which requires that all taxicabs, limousines,
commercially marked vehicles, tow trucks and the like be concealed in a garage or carport. Pickup
trucks are allowed, but if any property is stored in the bed, that property must not be visible from the
street.
38 E.g., Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 205 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964) (camp
trailers); Village of Glenview v. Van Dyke, 240 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (camp trailers); Disney
v. City of Concord, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (Ct. App. 2011) (recreational vehicles); Whaley v.
Dorchester Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 524 S.E.2d 404, 408 (S.C. 1999) (commercial vehicles,
defined as those exceeding five tons in weight or eight feet in height, or having more than two axles);
People v. Tolman, 168 Cal. Rptr. 328 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1980) (commercial vehicles exceeding
three tons); Recreational Vehicle United Citizens Ass’n v. City of Sterling Heights, 418 N.W.2d 702
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (campers, boats, snowmobiles, and trailers). For a detailed discussion of such
regulations, see 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §
83:37 (4th ed. 2012).
39 Order on Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7, Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, No. 0308911-CA-24 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005) (No. 23971-1588).
40 Id.
41 Coral Springs is a suburban community about 40 miles north of Miami but in a different
appellate district. Florida also has a third city with the word “coral” in its name, but fortunately, Cape
Coral does not come into this story.
42 396 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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court suggested that the ordinance was unreasonable because of its effect on
residents’ ability to receive visitors or to park a non-commercial truck in
front of the house. But on the other hand, the court also distinguished the
case from Wood, because, unlike in Wood, the Coral Springs ordinance
failed to allow owners to park their vehicles even in an enclosed garage.
This led the trial court in Kuvin to believe that Proctor was inapt.43 So
Proctor could be read as holding that the Coral Springs law was
unreasonable either because it lacked a garage exception, or because it
failed to distinguish commercial from non-commercial pickup trucks, and
perhaps infringed on freedom of association.
In a concurring opinion in Proctor, Judge Daniel T.K. Hurley
expressly stated that he saw the ordinance as violating the right to
association under the federal and state constitutions.44 Judge Hurley noted
that Proctor’s truck had been ticketed while it was parked at the homes of
his friends and his mother-in-law.45 Judge Hurley also suggested that the
ordinance might raise privacy issues under the state and federal
constitutions because of the special protection that applies to the home.46
He said that the ordinance should be subject to strict scrutiny pursuant to
NAACP v. Alabama.47
In a dissenting opinion in Proctor, Judge John H. Moore II disagreed
with the majority’s opinion that the ordinance was unreasonable.48 Judge
Moore also said that he “fail[ed] to see how a violation of this relatively
clear and simple parking ordinance rises to the level of such constitutional
proportions as suggested by Judge Hurley.”49 Finally, Judge Moore
chastised the court for substituting its judgment for that of Coral Springs’
leaders absent a clear constitutional violation.50
In City of Nichols Hills v. Richardson,51 an Oklahoma appellate court
overturned a municipal ordinance prohibiting the overnight parking of
pickup trucks in residential neighborhoods. The court recognized the

43

Order on Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 39, at 6.
Proctor, 396 So. 2d at 772-73 (Hurley, J., concurring) (“It is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters . . . .”)
(citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
45 Proctor, 396 So. 2d at 773.
46 Id. (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court had “declared the privacy of the homeplace to be
virtually sacrosanct” in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and that Florida courts have held that
the right of privacy “includes the right to be free from unreasonable restrictions on the use of the
residence,” citing Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
47 Proctor, 396 So. 2d 774.
48 Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 City of Nichols Hills v. Richardson, 939 P.2d 17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
44
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legitimate governmental interest in aesthetics, but found the ordinance both
over- and under-inclusive.52 The court, after citing Proctor as agreeing,
wrote:
Any vehicle that meets the definition of a “private passenger vehicle,”
no matter how ugly, rusted or offensive, may be parked in this
municipality between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. However,
not a single pickup, no matter how new, expensive, or “pleasing to the
eye,” may be parked in any driveway during these hours.53
Another pickup case was Minx v. Village of Flossmoor,54 in which the
plaintiff truck owner claimed an equal protection violation because the
defendant municipality prohibited him from parking his non-commercial
pick-up truck in his driveway, but allowed passenger cars. The court
rejected the village’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim.55
While noting that equal-protection challenges to zoning rules seldom
succeed,56 the court, in a facetious footnote, pointed to a number of logical
problems raised by the village’s ordinance:
While not pertinent to the present motion, the court wonders how pickup owners in Flossmoor will fix flat tires. The court also is curious as
to how Flossmoor’s pick-up owners will wash their trucks without
flooding their garages. They supposedly could have someone drive
their vehicles back and forth on their driveways or in front of their
house, so as not to have the vehicle parked, while stationary persons
wash the truck.57
That brings us to Kuvin. After losing in the trial court, Kuvin sought
review in Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal, and a divided threejudge panel found the Coral Gables ordinance unconstitutional as applied to
the plaintiff’s truck.58 Applying rational-basis scrutiny,59 the majority
found that the ordinance was not rationally related to either of two possible
governmental purposes.60 The ordinance wasn’t rationally related to
keeping commercial vehicles out of a residential neighborhood because

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 19.
Id.
Minx v. Vill. of Flossmoor, 724 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 594.
Id. at n.2.
Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 604, 604-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 605-06.
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Kuvin’s truck was not commercial.61 And the ordinance was not rationally
related to aesthetics for the same reasons cited in City of Nichols Hills: the
ordinance allows ugly cars but not attractive trucks.62 Writing for the court,
Senior Judge Alan R. Schwartz said “there is nothing to distinguish Kuvin’s
truck or others like it from what some might think are even more
aesthetically displeasing cars or, even more plainly, from one of whatever
make or model which is in obvious disrepair or just plain dirty.”63
Judge Schwartz distinguished Kuvin from Wood in that different types
of vehicles were involved, and in that plaintiff Kuvin had no garage in
which to conceal his vehicle, unlike plaintiff Wood.64
Judge Schwartz also raised some privacy and associational issues
similar to those in Judge Hurley’s concurring opinion in Proctor.65 Because
the city’s aesthetic rationale was implausible, Judge Schwartz reasoned, the
city must be targeting pickup drivers for some reason related to their tastes
or lifestyle.66 The city “require[d] Kuvin to choose between owning and
parking a personal vehicle of his choice in Coral Gables and leaving town
(which is what Kuvin, taking his cursed truck with him, actually did). That
is a decision that no government may require.”67 Judge Schwartz cited no
case or legal proposition for this statement. Then he went further,
declaring: “[T]here is a larger issue at stake here. Absent any legitimate
basis for the ordinances, what remains is that the City Parents disapprove of
a perhaps unorthodox vehicle and the possibly diverse taste and lifestyle
which may be reflected by its ownership.”68 Citing Judge Hurley’s opinion
in Proctor and a U.S. Supreme Court case striking down a municipal
attempt to define “family,”69 Judge Schwartz wrote:
For a governmental decision to be based on such considerations is
more than wrong; it is frightening. Perhaps Coral Gables can require
that all its houses be made of ticky-tacky and that they all look just the
same, but it cannot mandate that its people are, or do. Our nation and
way of life are based on a treasured diversity, but Coral Gables
punishes it. Such an action may not be upheld.70
As in Proctor before it, the Kuvin panel opinion included three
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 606.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 608.
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separate opinions from as many judges.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Angel A. Cortiñas added that he saw a
clear distinction between “commercial and/recreational vehicles,” on the
one hand, and “personal use mainstream vehicles” on the other.71 The
former could rationally be kept out of residential neighborhoods, while the
latter could not.72 “Like Judge Schwartz, I find this distinction to be
frightening,” Cortiñas wrote. “It would allow government to regulate the
types of personal use vehicles its citizens drive simply based on their
outward appearance. Such a holding embraces George Orwell’s dystopia,
where personal rights are subverted by the government.”73
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Leslie B. Rothenberg suggested her
colleagues get back to basics. Citing cases like Euclid and Ocean & Inland
Co., Judge Rothenberg pointed out that a zoning ordinance is subject only
to rational-basis scrutiny and “must be upheld if reasonable persons could
differ as to its propriety.”74 Judge Rothenberg also noted that Florida
allows zoning regulations supported solely on aesthetic grounds.75 Bound
by these precedents, Judge Rothenberg argued, the court was obliged to
defer to Coral Gables and uphold the ordinance.76
Despite this call for deference to legislators, however, Judge
Rothenberg went further and reached the affirmative conclusion that “openbed pickup trucks parked in residential neighborhoods at night detract from
their residential character”77 because pickups are designed for commercial
use.78 Explaining the connection between aesthetics and pickup trucks,
Judge Rothenberg wrote:
These ordinances make perfect sense and are rationally related to
maintaining and enhancing the residential character of the City’s
neighborhoods and the aesthetics of the City because any vehicle that
was designed for commercial use, regardless of whether it is used for
commercial purposes, looks the same and is likely to be used to store
and carry bulk material exposed to public view.79
While acknowledging that the majority applied rational basis, albeit
reaching the wrong result, Judge Rothenberg also considered and rejected
71

Id. at 609 (Cortiñas, J., concurring).
Id. at 611 (citing City of Nichols Hills v. Richardson, 939 P.2d 17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997),
and Proctor v. City of Coral Springs, 396 So. 2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
73 Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 611.
74 Id. at 613 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 614-15.
76 Id. at 615.
77 Id. at 615.
78 Id. at 617.
79 Id. at 616.
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Kuvin’s argument that the ordinance infringes on his fundamental right to
freedom of association, and therefore, that strict scrutiny should apply.80
Relying on cases such as Roberts v. U.S. Jaycess,81 Judge Rothenberg
delineated two types of freedom of association: intimate relationships and
expressive association.82 “Intimate relationships” refers to “marriage, the
begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and
cohabitation with relatives.”83 Kuvin’s claim that the city ordinance
prevented him from visiting close friends in the city after 7:00 p.m. in his
truck would not prove an infringement of an intimate relationship because
close friendships are not intimate relationships akin to marriage and
parenthood, Judge Rothenberg argued.84 As for expressive association,
Judge Rothenberg pointed to cases where it has been held to include
“service activities, transmitting values like the Boy Scouts of America . . .
and ‘civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities.’”85
Kuvin’s social meetings with friends are not analogous to these cases
because they lack a real expressive element, Judge Rothenberg said.86
Moreover, the city’s ordinance did not impede these meetings because it did
not stop him from owning a truck; it merely required him to keep it
garaged.87
The city asked for a rehearing en banc, which was granted.88 The en
banc court reversed the panel decision by a vote of 6-2.89 A modified
version of Judge Rothenberg’s panel dissent became the opinion of the
court. Judge Frank A. Shepherd issued a concurring opinion,90 while Judge
Cortiñas issued a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Vance E. Salter.91
In his concurring opinion, Judge Shepherd chides both the majority
and the dissent for substituting their respective judgments for those of the
Coral Gables City Commission.92 He wrote: “I am more concerned by the
enthusiasm with which the majority embraces these ordinances. I do not

80

Id. at 621-24.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
82 Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 622-24 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 622.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 623-24.
88 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 641-42.
91 Id. at 642-48. Note that Judge Schwartz did not participate in the en banc rehearing because he
was a senior judge.
92 Id. at 641 (“It is up to the Coral Gables City Commission to decide whether to make any
change in their ordinances.”).
81
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believe the ordinances ‘make perfect sense.’ In fact, it is not our place to so
decide. Aesthetic judgments necessarily are subjective in nature, defying
objective evaluation.”93 He concluded:
If I were a member of the Coral Gables City Commission, I might
argue it is improvident to maintain the ordinances before us on the
City’s books. As a member of this Court, I am not privileged to do so.
However, under our system of government, it is our expectation as
citizens that improvident decisions of local government, as
distinguished from unlawful decisions, “will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch
has acted.” This is as it should be.94
In his dissent, Judge Cortiñas recaps his and Judge Schwartz’s
arguments from their majority opinion in the panel decision.95
The Kuvin case reached its conclusion when the Florida Supreme
Court refused to hear Kuvin’s appeal.96
ANALYSIS
Kuvin was a difficult case. It presented a situation in which the
government was intruding into an unusual sphere of everyday life. While
most people would not be surprised to learn of a local regulation prohibiting
the parking of a camper or a box truck in a private driveway, a rule against
an empty and unmarked pickup truck isn’t common. On the other hand,
what right did the law interfere with? In the pickup cases discussed above,
most judges did not see a fundamental right to free association being
implicated. Plainly, Kuvin’s use of his property – both his land and his
truck – was affected by the ordinance. But for substantive97 due-process
purposes, property rights are not fundamental and therefore may be
infringed without triggering elevated scrutiny.98
As suggested by cases like Euclid, the U.S. Supreme Court has given
legislative bodies wide leeway to limit the use of private property without
effecting a taking. Justice Holmes explained the rationale ninety years ago
93

Id. at 642 (internal citation omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
95 Id. at 642-48.
96 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 64 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 2011).
97 Infringement of property rights do, of course, trigger procedural due process, ensuring the
property owner gets notice and a hearing before the government infringes them. E.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). Procedural due process is not at issue here.
98 See, e.g., 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 15.4(e) (5th
ed. 2012) (“[A] majority of Justices continue to use the rational basis test to approve laws . . . restricting
the use of property.”).
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in this famous passage from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the
contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration
in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So
the question depends upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is
given to the judgment of the legislature but it always is open to
interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power.99
Kuvin never argued that the city was effecting a regulatory taking.
Neither his house nor his truck were taken, and he did not argue that the
city’s action substantially diminished their value.
This brings us back to substantive due process. With no fundamental
right at issue, Kuvin’s only protection was rational-basis scrutiny. And, as
Judge Rothenberg notes, rational basis “is the most relaxed and tolerant
form of judicial scrutiny.”100 Since we already know that the state has a
legitimate interest in aesthetics, Kuvin’s only hope was that a court would
find that the relationship between aesthetics and the blanket ban on pickups
was “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”101
And, just as he hoped, the panel majority found the ordinance both overand under-inclusive.
Here we encounter a problem with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationalbasis jurisprudence: it’s not entirely clear when courts are supposed to
examine the fit of a regulation to determine whether it is over- or underinclusive.102 Some commentators believe that fit is irrelevant to rationalbasis analysis.103 But, the Supreme Court has expressly considered fit while
99

260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 632 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989)).
101 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
102 See, e.g., 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 18.3(b) (5th
ed.) (“The rationality test is easy to state: the classification only has to have a rational relationship to any
legitimate governmental interest in order to comply with the equal protection guarantee. However, the
meaning of that test is not clear.”).
103 E.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 374 (1999) (stating that “overinclusion and
underinclusion” are “usually thought to be without significance under traditional rational basis
deference”); Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV.
447, 478 (1989) (“Under the rational basis test, probably no amount of overinclusion or underinclusion
100
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applying rational basis in some cases, such as in Cleburne and U.S.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.104 Many commentators, attempting
to reconcile these cases with others involving rational-basis scrutiny,
concluded that Cleburne and their ilk actually involved a different test.105
Interestingly, it’s not clear that the majority in the en banc Kuvin
decision considered fit irrelevant. Judge Rothenberg went beyond merely
saying that she didn’t think Kuvin had proved the Coral Gables ordinance
irrational, and therefore that the court must defer to the City Commission.
She went further, holding that the ordinance was indeed rational.
But if fit is not the measure of an ordinance’s “rational relationship” to
a legitimate governmental purpose, what is? Is there any way the pickup
truck ordinance could have been struck down under a rational-basis
analysis? And if not, is there some other rule that should apply to aesthetic
regulations?
The following sections will examine theories under which ordinances
like the one in Kuvin could be struck down. The first two theories, under
the heading of “Roads Not Taken,” are arguments available under current
law, but that Kuvin did not fully develop or failed to use at all. The
remaining theories, under the heading of “Removing Roadblocks,” would
require legislative or judicial action to implement.
ROADS NOT TAKEN
Based on the facts and legal issues presented, it’s no surprise that the
en banc court rejected Kuvin’s appeal. After all, as Judge Rothenberg
pointed out, if reasonable people can disagree about whether an ordinance is
irrational, it isn’t. This point seems to dispose of the case by effectively
taking further analysis out of the court’s jurisdiction.
But, as in almost every area of law, the rational-basis rules have
exceptions. Unfortunately for Lowell Kuvin, his briefs only hinted at, or
missed altogether, some of the strongest arguments available to him.
That’s not to say he necessarily would have won had he offered these
arguments. After all, the en banc vote was 6-2. And the arguments
discussed below may still strike many judges as too weak to overcome the
heavy burden needed to strike down a law under rational basis.
But one has to imagine that at least some of the judges in this case
were scratching their heads, as much as any lay observer, in trying to figure
is too much.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56,
79 (1997) (“[J]udicial scrutiny under rational basis review is typically so deferential as to amount to a
virtual rubber stamp.”).
104 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
105 E.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 795 (1987).
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out how Coral Gables could effectively tell Lowell Kuvin that he couldn’t
drive the nation’s most popular vehicle. At least some of these judges had
to be looking for an argument to overturn the ordinance, at least as applied
to Kuvin, that would not get reversed by the Florida Supreme Court. Kuvin
didn’t give them that argument.
But that doesn’t stop a Monday-morning quarterback. Here are some
possibilities.
1. Ordinances Based on Irrational Animus Fail on Rational Basis
The Coral Gables truck ordinance dates to 1960,106 and several facts
have been cited to support the theory that the original purpose of the
ordinance was not aesthetics but the exclusion of working-class people
from the city. While the modern pickup truck is a common substitute for a
personal car, the pickup of the 1950s and 60s was a work vehicle.
Moreover, Coral Gables represents the ordinance as grounded in aesthetics,
but applies the law only at night, when the vehicles in question would be
difficult to see.
Or, as resident Larry Horton told the city’s Zoning Board at a public
hearing:
This is ridiculous. If it’s for aesthetics, you’d have to regulate it
during the day. Now, my personal feeling is that really, this is not
about pickup trucks. This is an attempt to keep working class people
who own pickup trucks from purchasing and living in the City of Coral
Gables. . . .107
This was a common refrain from critics of the ordinance. For example, Joel
Hollander, a University of Miami art history professor, told the Miami
Herald on election day: “It just seems like a class issue. When it was
enacted decades ago, it was to keep the lower class out of Coral Gables.”108
Finally, the ordinance was contemporaneous with a number of other
laws with similar animus. For example, the 1967 edition of the Coral
Gables City Code included a provision authorizing the officials to prevent
“undesirable persons,” such as paupers, from entering or remaining in the
city.109
The same code also mandated racial segregation of
neighborhoods.110 According to University of Miami law Professor

106 Transcript of Coral Gables Zoning Board Meeting at 11 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.coralgables.com/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=9012.
107 Id. at 27.
108 Howard Cohen, 50-Year-Old Ban on Pickups Likely Scrapped, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 2012,
at 4B.
109 CORAL GABLES, FLA. CITY CODE, § 8 (1967).
110 Id.
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Anthony Alfieri and others, Coral Gables operated an incinerator called
“Old Smokey” in a black neighborhood just outside the city during the
1960s, until the incinerator was closed as a public nuisance.111 The city
apparently also had laws prohibiting black people from being in the city
after dark without permission, according to Professor Alfieri.112
In fact, Judges Hurley and Schwartz hinted that Coral Gables and
Coral Springs might have had unspoken, nefarious motives for banning
pickup trucks in their respective cities. Judge Hurley’s remark about
elitism seems to imply an animus against people who are not wealthy. And
indeed, Coral Gables is a wealthy city. The median home in Coral Gables
was worth $388,290 in 2012, more than triple the countywide average of
$122,871, according to the Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser.113 For
the five years ending in 2011, the median household income was
$88,167,114 compared to a countywide average of $43,957.115 Kuvin was a
waiter when he was first ticketed in 2003, but went to law school after the
case began.116
These facts suggest several possible arguments, all of which come
down to the same general idea: a regulation is irrational if motivated by
animus against a particular group.
As a way to explain the Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence, at least
one scholar, Susannah Pollvogt, has suggested that the underlying principle
is one of “animus.”117 In Moreno, for example, the Court found that rules
aimed at denying welfare benefits to “hippies” lacked a rational basis
because a “bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”118 That’s an example
of what Pollvogt means by “animus.” Pollvogt concludes that “animus is
present where the public laws are harnessed to create and enforce

111 Anthony V. Alfieri, Zachary A. Lipshultz & Steven E. Lipshultz, Find Somewhere Else to
Park Those Trolleys, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 2013, at 9A.
112 Jenny Staletovich, Trolley-Garage Fight Continuing, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10, 2013, at 3B
(“‘This is a community with a very deep, troubled racial history. In our lifetime, black workers in the
West Grove could not be in Coral Gables after dark without the permission of a homeowner,’ said
Alfieri.”).
113 2012 Preliminary Average and Median Residential Values, MIAMI-DADE CTY. PROP.
APPRAISER (July 1, 2012), http://www.miamidade.gov/pa/library/reports/2012-average-medianresidential-values.pdf.
114 State and County Quick Facts: Coral Gables, Fla., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/1214250.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2014, 10:50 AM).
115 State and County Quick Facts: Miami-Dade County, Fla., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12086.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2014, 5:28 PM).
116 Susannah A. Nesmith, Overnight Truck Ban Ruled Out, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 23, 2007, at
A1.
117 Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
118 U.S. Dep’t. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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distinctions between social groups — that is, groups of persons identified
by status rather than conduct.”119
The U.S. Supreme Court mentioned animus in Romer v. Evans,120 in
which it overturned a Colorado constitutional amendment that would have
prohibited the state from protecting gays from discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy said the
amendment failed rational-basis scrutiny because it sought to disadvantage
gays based on “animosity toward the class of persons affected.”121 Quoting
Moreno, Kennedy added: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.”122
It’s important to note that Romer was a rational-basis case. The Court
did not hold that gays are a protected class subject to elevated scrutiny.
Instead, the Court held that Colorado’s animus against gays made the
constitutional amendment irrational.
In a sign that animus remains a valid doctrine, the Court again cited to
Moreno in a major gay marriage case this year. United States v. Windsor123
involved a lesbian couple that lived in New York but was legally married in
Canada. New York recognized the couple’s marriage, but, pursuant to the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),124 the IRS did not.125 So when one of
the spouses died, the other had to pay $363,053 in federal estate tax.126 If
the IRS had recognized the marriage, the surviving spouse would have
owed nothing.127 The woman paid the tax and sued for a refund.128 The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down DOMA’s definition of
marriage, holding that it was based on an improper animus, or motivation to
hurt an unpopular group, namely gays.129
Cases like Moreno, Romer and Windsor are relevant to Kuvin because
they show that laws may be overturned when based on animus against a
particular group, even if that group is not a “suspect class” entitled to

119

Pollvogt, supra note 117, at 926.
517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
121 Id. at 634.
122 Id. (emphasis in original).
123 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
124 Codified in relevant part at 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2696 (2013).
125 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 2693 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)).
120
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elevated scrutiny. Poor people, like gays, are not a suspect class130 but
might still be entitled to protection from animus-based legislation. If Kuvin
could have developed the evidence on the legislative history of the Coral
Gables truck ordinance, he might have been able to show that it was
grounded in an unconstitutional animus against blue-collar people.
This kind of argument already has an analogue in land-use law:
exclusionary zoning. Exclusionary zoning “is the use of a local zoning
ordinance to promote housing segregation,” typically based on income.131
To some extent, all zoning is “exclusionary” in that it seeks to separate uses
thought to be incompatible, such as homes and factories.132 Moreover,
land-use laws aimed at protecting aesthetics may naturally come into
tension with the policy goal of ensuring that non-wealthy people have
access to safe housing.133 However, courts or legislatures sometimes
invalidate or prohibit government actions that take an excessive toll on
access to affordable housing.
The classic case is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel.134 In that case, the defendant municipality had 4,121 acres
zoned for industrial use, only 100 of which were occupied.135 Nevertheless,
the township refused to allow a nonprofit organization to build affordable
housing unless it consisted of single-family homes on half-acre lots, which
would have been impossible.136 The plaintiff civil rights organization sued,
claiming the township was trying to keep low and moderate-income
families out.137 The New Jersey Supreme Court, largely on state
constitutional grounds, held that municipalities have a duty to provide a
range of housing options and may not use restrictive zoning regulations to
keep out less-wealthy families.138 Moreover, the court held that when a
municipality fails to provide a range of housing options, the normal
presumption of validity is reversed, such that the ordinance will be
presumed invalid until and unless the municipality can prove otherwise.139

130

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
Mandara Meyers, Comment, (Un)equal Protection for the Poor: Exclusionary Zoning and the
Need for Stricter Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 349, 354 (2003).
132 See, e.g., 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §
22:1 (4th ed. 2013) (“Practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose and effect the exclusion of
some activity or use.”).
133 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 293 (2002).
134 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
135 Id. at 719.
136 Id. at 719-20.
137 Id. at 716.
138 Id. at 725, 728.
139 Id. at 728.
131
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Mount Laurel was influential in bringing attention to the issue of
exclusionary zoning,140 but states vary widely in their approach to the
problem, and New Jersey’s approach probably is more aggressive than
most. In Florida, state law requires municipalities to provide land zoned for
affordable housing,141 but enforcement is handled administratively with
highly deferential judicial review.142
Nevertheless, exclusionary zoning could have served as a handy
metaphor to show the Kuvin court that the principle of Romer can apply to
land-use and that the Florida Legislature considers affordable housing a
policy priority.
The exclusionary zoning concept aside, at least one reported case
applied a kind of animus analysis in a land-use context. In Marks v. City of
Chesapeake, the Fourth Circuit reversed a Virginia city’s decision to deny a
conditional-use permit for a palm reader’s shop.143 The city’s planning staff
and Planning Commission recommended approval of the permit.144 But the
City Council rejected the permit after a number of residents argued against
it on religious grounds, with at least one person citing Bible verses in
support of his arguments.145 Marks filed a civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming the city’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious” and
therefore “a deprivation of property without due process of law.”146 The
federal district court agreed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that
“irrational, arbitrary governmental measures taken against a politically
unpopular target on the basis of complaining neighbors’ fears or negative
attitudes are repugnant to constitutional guarantees.”147 Citing Cleburne,
the court added: “As a general matter, therefore, the public’s ‘negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable
in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases’ for local officials’ land

140

See, e.g., 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM. LAW ZONING § 22:5 (5th ed. 2013).
FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2012).
142 E.g., Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. Collier Cnty., 819 So. 2d 200, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“In
that the legislature delegated to the Department [of Community Affairs] the power to enforce section
163.3177, we note that we are required to be highly deferential to the agency’s interpretation of such
statute.”).
143 Marks v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 883 F.2d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1989).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 309-10.
146 Id. at 310. Although the complaint was cast as a substantive due-process matter governed by
an arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the test is identical to the rational-basis standard applied in cases
like Kuvin. See, e.g., Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989) (In
evaluating a § 1983 complaint brought on substantive due-process grounds, the court held: “The relevant
question for consideration is whether there existed a rational basis for the City’s rejection of
Greenbriar’s plan, or, phrased in the alternative, whether the City’s action bore no substantial relation to
the general welfare.”)
147 City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d at 310.
141
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use decisions.”148
While a fascinating case, City of Chesapeake might not hold water in
the Eleventh Circuit to the extent that it was based on arbitrary denial of a
state-law property right. In the landmark149 case of McKinney v. Pate,150 the
Eleventh Circuit held that while a government employee may have a statelaw property right in his job, state abridgement of this right is not a
violation of substantive due process because this property right is not
“fundamental.”151 McKinney was entitled to procedural due process such
as notice and a fair hearing, but no more.152 The Eleventh Circuit has not
expressly extended this holding to cover land-use decisions, but trial courts
within the circuit have done so. For example, in Sullivan Properties, Inc. v.
City of Winter Springs, the Middle District of Florida found that even if the
plaintiff developer could prove that the defendant municipality arbitrarily
denied his land-use permit, McKinney precluded a claim for any substantive
due-process violation.153 Likewise in Bowman v. Alabama Department of
Human Resources, the Middle District of Alabama dismissed a complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because even if state
employees intentionally conspired to deprive the plaintiff of a day-care
license by violating state rules, the plaintiff still failed to state a valid claim
so long as the state correctly followed rules for a post-deprivation
hearing.154
Even before McKinney, the Eleventh Circuit had held in Greenbriar,
Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, that a land-use decision doesn’t necessarily violate
substantive due process just because it is based on political or “parochial”
interests, at least not if the record shows other justifications for the
decision.155 So when a Mormon church in Alabama was denied a zoning
permit based, apparently, on the church’s political unpopularity, the
frustrated trial judge said his hands were tied by Greenbriar:
Strain as it may, this court can find no avenue for the [plaintiffs]
around Greenbriar, which clearly stands for the proposition that

148

Id. at 311 (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)).
Cited more than 3,500 times, including in 660 cases, according to Westlaw.
150 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).
151 Id. at 1561 (“[A]lthough we acknowledge that McKinney’s allegations—if true—would be
lamentable, we nonetheless cannot find that . . . McKinney’s right to employment is so fundamental that
our democratic society and its inherent freedoms would be lost if that right were to be violated. . . . As
such, we likewise cannot find that McKinney’s state-created property right is deserving of substantive
due process protection.”)
152 Id.
153 899 F. Supp. 587, 596 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (“Sullivan may only bring a procedural due process
claim for Winter Springs’ alleged violations of Sullivan’s rights.”) (emphasis added).
154 857 F. Supp. 1524, 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
155 881 F.2d 1570, 1579 (11th Cir. 1989).
149
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elected officials who vote on zoning requests can act for purely
political reasons, because partisan, political decision-making, even by
unknowledgeable, close-minded politicians fearful of harm more than
political, is automatically deemed rational and, therefore, cannot be
arbitrary and capricious unless it is the product of corruption. . .156
Greenbriar was effectively mooted by the even more governmentfriendly decision in McKinney, but the former case shows just how reluctant
some courts can be to over-rule local land-use decisions.
Nevertheless, Kuvin could have attempted to portray the ordinance as
a holdover from a bygone era of economic discrimination, cut from the
same cloth as Jim Crow laws.
The argument has its weaknesses. In particular, we have no evidence
that current city officials were motivated by any animus against workingclass people, and the evidence against the 1960s city leaders is somewhat
circumstantial. In addition, pickup trucks no longer have an exclusively
blue-collar association, as evidenced by the availability of a Cadillac model.
But the evidence was sufficient to persuade judges like Hurley and
Schwartz that there was class snobbery afoot, and that was without Romer
to provide a legal framework to their intuitions. Perhaps with further
development of the evidence and this additional legal argument, Kuvin
might have persuaded others on the bench.
2. Ordinances that Ban Common, Harmless Activities Fail on Rational
Basis
Despite the strong presumption of validity of a municipal ordinance,
Florida appellate courts have occasionally struck down local ordinances
under a state version of the rational-basis test.157 On the one hand, these
cases are not recent, generally dating to the 1970s or earlier, and they cover
a variety of subjects, some having little relation to land use. But on the
other hand, these cases have not been expressly overruled, and were based
either on a clearly identifiable rational-basis test, or on a similar test of
reasonableness.
It would be hard to characterize these cases as a whole, but Kuvin may
have been on to something when he argued that “the complete prohibition
of ordinary conduct should be viewed with great suspicion.”158 To support
156 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 721 F. Supp. 1212, 1214
(N.D. Ala. 1989) (emphasis in original). First Amendment free-exercise complaints were allowed to
proceed, however.
157 See, e.g., 12A FLA. JUR. 2D Counties § 222 (2014) (listing four cases in which ordinances
were found to be based on unreasonable classifications).
158 Brief for Petitioner at 26, Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (No. 3D05–2845).
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this proposition, Kuvin cites Carter v. Town of Palm Beach,159 a 1970 case
in which the Florida Supreme Court struck down a total ban on surfing.
Although he did not do so, Kuvin also might have cited the 1957 case of
City of Miami v. Kayfetz,160 in which the state’s highest court struck down
an ordinance prohibiting bars from serving drinks to employees, even when
off-duty.
While no lawyer would want to rely too heavily on two cases of that
vintage, Carter and Kayfetz both stand clearly for the proposition that a
municipal ordinance may be struck down under a rational-basis test if the
relationship between the ordinance and the purported state interest is just
too attenuated. And while Kuvin’s argument that “the complete prohibition
of ordinary conduct should be viewed with great suspicion” is just that–an
argument and not the law–a good case can be made that he was right.
Kayfetz involved a City of Miami ordinance aimed at stopping a
practice whereby female bar employees known as “B-girls” would ask male
patrons to buy them drinks.161 The B-girls received commissions for each
drink a patron bought for them.162 Sometimes the bars would provide the
women with nonalcoholic beverages but charge the customer for a mixed
drink.163 The Miami ordinance contained several provisions, banning: (1)
female bar employees from mingling or fraternizing with customers; (2) bar
employees from soliciting drinks for themselves; (3) women from loitering
in a bar for the purpose of soliciting drinks; and (4) bar employees from
drinking liquor in their workplaces, or bar owners from serving them.164
The court carefully recited the presumptions in favor of the city and its
ordinance. The court was bound to “assume that a valid ordinance was
intended” and to “construe the ordinance to be legal, if possible.”165
“Further, the courts should be very cautious in declaring a municipal
ordinance unreasonable,” on the premise that the democratically elected city
leaders know best what their community wants and needs.166 And, the court
said, “[i]f reasonable argument exists on the question of whether the
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the legislative will must prevail.”167

159

237 So. 2d 130, 131-32 (Fla. 1970).
92 So. 2d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 1957).
161 Id. at 800.
162 Id. This practice evidently continues. At least a dozen people were convicted for a similar
scam in Miami Beach in 2012. The women were still known as B-girls. The FBI handled the
investigation, which reportedly involved as much as $1 million in losses to victims. E.g., Jay Weaver, 3
convicted in ‘B-girls’ rip-off case, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 20, 2012, at B1.
163 Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d at 800.
164 Id. at 799-800.
165 Id. at 801.
166 Id.
167 Id.
160
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Explaining the purpose of the ordinance, Miami’s mayor and city
manager testified that the B-girls induce male patrons to buy drinks “by the
visions, or promises, express or implied, of immoral relations with the
girls,” and that the practice also could facilitate prostitution.168 Based on
these facts, the court found that the city had articulated what we would now
call a legitimate governmental interest in protecting the morals169 of the
citizens and visitors to Miami.170
The Kayfetz court then upheld three of the four challenged provisions
in Miami’s ordinance. To reach that conclusion, the court considered
whether each provision was connected to stopping the immoral B-girl
system. For instance, the court found “a rational relation” between the antimingling provision and the goal of stopping B-girls,171 because a B-girl
must mingle with a customer in order to entice him to buy her drinks. The
court said the same about the provision banning employees from soliciting
drinks from customers.172 And, the court said, if the police power allows
the city to stop bar employees from soliciting drinks, “it necessarily
follows” that the rule against women173 “loitering” in bars seeking drinks
also must be valid.174
But the court struck down the provision banning bars from selling
alcoholic beverages to their employees. The reason: the court said it saw
“no more connection” between the city’s stated interest in morality and
employees drinking in bars than between the city’s stated interest and
customers drinking in bars.175 The purpose of the ordinance was not to
limit drinking but to limit the “mingling and fraternizing by the female
employees” and solicitation of drinks that could amount to fraud and lead to
immoral conduct.176
168

Id. at 800.
Florida follows the standard formulation that the police power allows regulations intended to
protect the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. E.g., Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Dep’t of
Bus. Regulation v. Florida Horse Council, Inc., 464 So. 2d 128, 130 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a ban on
Sunday horse-racing encourages people “to spend their weekend leisure time at non-gambling,
presumably more healthy recreational pursuits and other activities”). Florida also is one of a small
number of states that still has a criminal statute on the books banning non-marital cohabitation, FLA.
STAT. § 798.02, although the validity of this law was cast into doubt by Lawrence v. Texas, 553 U.S.
558 (2003).
170 Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d at 802.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 803.
173 Kayfetz was decided long before the U.S. Supreme Court had articulated that classifications
based on gender are subject to elevated scrutiny. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To
withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
174 Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d at 804.
175 Id. at 803.
176 Id. at 803-04.
169
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In Carter, the Florida Supreme Court struck down an absolute ban on
surfing anywhere along the Town of Palm Beach’s 13 miles of beachfront.
The court cited a 1934 case, Inglis v. Rymer,177 in which it held that a
municipality could regulate skating rinks but not ban them altogether
because they are not nuisances per se. Therefore, the court said, “the power
to restrain and regulate does not include the power to prohibit an activity
which is not a nuisance per se.”178 This statement appears to contradict the
court’s previous cases, discussed above, in which it declared aesthetics
alone to be sufficient basis for a municipal regulation. Those cases said
nothing about the severity of the aesthetic harm having to rise to the level of
nuisance.
Nuisance in Florida is “using one’s property as to injure the land or
some incorporeal right of one’s neighbor.”179 The Carter court referenced a
specific category of nuisance, the “nuisance per se.” Florida courts have
tended to decide what is or is not a nuisance per se on a use-by-use basis,180
but “[g]enerally, before a thing becomes a nuisance per se at common law,
it must be either unlawful in itself or of such inherent qualities that its
natural tendency, wherever located, is to produce injury.”181 So the Carter
court seems to be saying that if a municipality wants to categorically ban
something, then that something must be categorically obnoxious.
In other words, the absolute ban on surfing was so over-inclusive as to
be irrational. If the town believed that surfing interfered with swimming or
other activities on the beach, it could limit surfing to designated areas.182
But “[t]here does not appear to be anything inherently obnoxious or illegal,
per se, about surfing that requires or necessitates it being totally prohibited,
anymore than it would be reasonable to prohibit fishing entirely along the
shore of the ocean within the Town.”183 This sounds a lot like judges

177

152 So. 4 (Fla. 1934).
Carter v. Town of Palm Beach, 237 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1970). The court’s language about
nuisance could be seen as presaging Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), in which the
federal Supreme Court would hold that a regulation that prevents all use of a piece of real property
amounts to a taking unless the regulation merely prevents the owner from doing something he could not
have done under the state law of nuisance.
179 Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1956) (adopting language from Antonik v.
Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947)) (internal citations omitted).
180 E,g., State ex rel. Knight v. City of Miami, 53 So. 2d 636, 637 (Fla. 1951) (holding garbage
disposal plant not a nuisance per se); Brooks v. Patterson, 31 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 1947) (holding
airport is not a nuisance per se); Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 572 F.2d 1108, 1112
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding jail/work release facility not a nuisance per se).
181 Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 572 F.2d at 1112 (citing 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 13).
182 Carter v. Town of Palm Beach, 237 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1970) (quoting an unpublished
opinion of the local circuit court, which ordinarily is a trial court but in the case heard the first appeal
from the municipal court).
183 Id.
178
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Schwartz and Cortiñas’ opinions in Kuvin. It also sounds like the court is
calling for the municipality to factually justify its ordinance, which, as
discussed above, most courts do not think municipalities should have to do
in rational-basis cases.
Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that the Florida Supreme
Court got it right in both Kayfetz and Carter. Both cases acknowledge that
the government exceeds its authority when it absolutely bans a harmless
and commonplace activity — such as bar employees drinking in their
workplace when off duty in Kayfetz, and surfing in Carter.
Nor are these cases unique. In Delmonico v. State,184 the Florida
Supreme Court struck down a state law banning possession of spearfishing
equipment anywhere in Monroe County,185 where the purpose of the statute
was to help enforce a ban on spearfishing in some areas of the county. The
statute had the effect of preventing spearfishing even in places where it was
legal – in effect making it over-inclusive. “In order to meet constitutional
limitations on police regulation, this prohibition, i.e. against possession of
objects having a common and widespread lawful use, must under our
previous decisions be reasonably ‘required as incidental to the
accomplishment of the primary purpose of the Act.’”186 In other words, if
the State wanted to limit a commonplace activity, the terms of the
regulation had to be rationally related to the State’s goals.
The Florida Supreme Court made the same point in Inglis, when it
found that the state could limit roller-skating rinks, but not ban such a
“harmless” activity otherwise permitted under state law.187
A number of points may be made in response to this argument.
First, the cases cited are few and old. It could be argued that they are
outdated, harkening to a time when courts were more inclined to limit the
police power. But Kayfetz and Carter, for example, both came after the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Berman that the police power is broad enough
to include the power to regulate aesthetics. Kayfetz and Carter also came
after Florida adopted Euclid’s “fairly debatable” standard and applied it to
aesthetics in Ocean and Inland Co. In other words, by the time of Kayfetz
and Carter, the Florida Supreme Court already had given municipalities
enormous leeway to regulate within the police power, but overturned the
surfing and drinking ordinances anyway. One way to interpret this pattern
of cases is to conclude that while the court recognized the power of
municipalities to regulate aesthetics, it did not recognize a municipal power

184

155 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963).
Monroe County contains the Florida Keys, a chain of islands and a popular fishing area.
186 Delmonico, 155 So. 2d at 370 (emphasis added).
187 Inglis v. Rymer, 152 So. 4, 5 (Fla. 1934).
185
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to ban harmless and commonplace activities. Therefore, an aesthetic
regulation is not “fairly debatable” or rationally related to aesthetics if it has
the effect of banning a harmless and commonplace activity.
The syllogism is easily completed by adding that nighttime parking of
a noncommercial pickup truck in a residential neighborhood, like surfing or
adult drinking in a bar, is a commonplace and harmless activity that may
not be absolutely banned. At the very least, this argument seems strong
enough to overcome the presumption of legislative validity, and demand
evidence from the municipality to show the harm created by pickup trucks.
Another criticism of this argument is that the cases discussed above are
not about aesthetically based land-use regulations. Had the Florida
Supreme Court never ruled on the specific question of whether aesthetics
are a sufficient basis to support a land-use regulation, the Kayfetz line of
cases would be more persuasive, but in light of cases like Ocean and Inland
Co., the more specific rule should prevail. This is a valid point, but still
does nothing to explain the difference between Ocean and Inland Co. on
the one hand and cases like Carter and Inglis on the other. Put another
way, if a city can’t ban roller-rinks or surfing, how can it ban pickup
trucks?
REMOVING ROADBLOCKS
The arguments above are available under current law. But it may be
that these arguments are too tenuous, and that the Kuvin court was bound to
uphold Coral Gables’s ordinance under rational-basis scrutiny. On the
other hand, as discussed above, the fact that Kuvin was unable to keep a
pickup truck in Coral Gables will strike many people, including many who
think Judge Rothenberg was correct on the law, as anomalous or even
absurd. When correct application of the law leads to such a result, the law
may need to be tweaked.
The following sections suggest some relatively modest changes that
might avoid anomalous results like the one in Kuvin.
1. Limiting the Application of the Police Power to Aesthetics
As discussed above, Berman v. Parker and its progeny held that the
police power permits states to regulate aesthetics. But just because the U.S.
Supreme Court doesn’t limit state power to regulate aesthetics doesn’t mean
that states can’t impose their own limits.
And indeed, the Florida Legislature has a demonstrated interest in
limiting the state’s power over land use even when judges say the state
could go further. A great example is the state’s reaction to Kelo v. City of
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New London,188 in which the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the defendant
city to take private homes and transfer them to a private company for
redevelopment purposes even though the locality made no claim that the
homes were blighted. Less than a year after the Court announced Kelo, the
Florida Legislature passed a law189 limiting the use of eminent domain to
traditional purposes, such as highways and power lines, and expressly
prohibiting its use for urban renewal even when blight is shown.190 “We
have eliminated the Kelo problem,” said state Representative Dwight
Stansel, a Democrat, at the time.191 But lawmakers went further, calling a
referendum to enshrine an anti-Kelo provision in the state constitution. In
November 2006, the amendment passed by a two-to-one margin.192 The
amendment created a new provision in the state constitution,193 requiring a
three-fifths majority for the Legislature to transfer condemned property to a
private party.194
The Florida Legislature has responded similarly to state court
decisions that limit compensation for regulatory takings to cases in which a
regulation “deprives the owner of substantial economic use of his or her
property.”195 In response, the Legislature in 1995 passed the Bert J. Harris,
Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act,196 which created a new cause of
action for property owners against state agencies whose regulations
“inordinately burden” a particular private tract.197

188

545 U.S. 469 (2005).
FLA. STAT. §§ 73.013-73.014 (2012).
190 One of the noteworthy facts of Kelo was that the Court permitted the taking despite the
absence of any showing of blight. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (“Those who govern the City were not
confronted with the need to remove blight . . . but their determination that the area was sufficiently
distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.”).
191 Alex Leary, Limits on Property Seizures Go to Governor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 5,
2006, at 5B.
192 Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at 1B.
193 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c).
194 Another oft-criticized aspect of the Kelo decision was the Court’s willingness to allow a city
to take unblighted land from one private party and then transfer it to another private party. E.g., Kelo,
545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today significantly expands the meaning of
public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use,
and give it over for new, ordinary private use . . . .”).
195 E.g., Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1990) (citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)).
196 FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2012).
197 The Act’s actual effectiveness in aiding landowners seems to have been dubious at best. E.g.,
Susan L. Trevarthen, Advising the Client Regarding Protection of Property Rights: Harris Act and
Inverse Condemnation Claims, FLA. B.J., July/August 2004, at 61, 65 (calling the Act a “paper tiger”).
Nevertheless, it illustrates the Florida Legislature’s interest in rebalancing the judicial scales away from
the government and in favor of private property owners. See, e.g., John T. Marshall, The Property
Rights Movement and Historic Preservation in Florida: The Impact of the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private
Property Protection Act, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 285 (1997) (“Florida shot to the forefront of
189
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Florida could take similar steps to curb over-reaching aesthetic
regulations. Several avenues could be used for this purpose.
For example, Florida could join those states that hold that aesthetics
alone are insufficient to support a regulation.
But such a scheme would raise practical challenges. First, in the past,
courts employing an “aesthetics plus” rule have often accepted dubious
claims of an additional governmental interest to justify what appeared to be
a wholly aesthetics-driven regulation. For example, in St. Louis Gunning
Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that regulation of property on purely aesthetic grounds might be tantamount
to a taking,198 but a St. Louis billboard ordinance was nevertheless valid
because billboards “constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and
all classes of miscreants.”199 Professor Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. says this was
a common “bootstrapping technique to circumvent the prohibition of early
period aesthetic doctrine.”200
It seems hard to imagine a modern court accepting a sham public
purpose for a billboard ordinance, but modern courts have often been
willing to defer to localities on land-use decisions even at the expense of
individual property rights. The prototypical case is Kelo,201 in which the
Supreme Court deferred to the defendant city’s judgment that transferring a
private home to a business for a private development was a “public use.”202
Moreover, it’s easy for a locality to come up with a public purpose that
purports to be “in addition to” aesthetics, but really just provides the same
justification in different words. For example, a locality could say an
aesthetic rule is needed to preserve property values or to protect the
residential character of a neighborhood. So long as the state’s bare
assertion of such an interest is sufficient, courts would have little choice but
to defer to the government.
One obvious fix to the latter problem would be to use a burden-shifting
regime, whereby if a plaintiff makes a prima facie case that an aesthetic

the national property rights movement when Governor Lawton Chiles signed the Bert J. Harris, Jr.
Private Property Protection Act.”).
198 137 S.W. 929, 952 (1911), dismissed per stipulation sub nom. St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co
v. City of St. Louis, 231 U.S. 761 (1913).
199 Id. at 942.
200 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:4 (4th
ed. 2013).
201 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
202 In criticizing the majority’s holding, Justice Thomas questioned why the court was so
deferential to the city here when it would never defer to the city on other constitutional matters, such as
whether a police search was unconstitutional. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518 (“[T]here is no justification for the
almost complete deference [the Court] grants to legislatures as to what” constitutes a public purpose.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).

28 ANDRON_PUBLISHER2 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/13/2014 8:28 PM

2013] Can a City Declare that All Pickup Trucks Are Legally Ugly?

111

regulation is unrelated or only tenuously related to the asserted state
interest, the burden then shifts to the state to show the rational relationship.
But this is not how rational-basis is applied under current law. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held:
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification. Where there are “plausible
reasons” for Congress’ action, “our inquiry is at an end.” This
standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. “The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”203
Moreover, a state “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification.”204 And “[t]he burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it.”205 In theory, then, no matter how strong a case a
plaintiff can make that a law is not rationally related to the state’s purported
interest, the state need never marshal a shred of evidence to defend itself.206
This stands in contrast with elevated levels of scrutiny, where the state
must show some degree of fit between its law and its purpose. That’s why
in Gold Coast Publications, the City of Coral Gables crafted a detailed
scheme of objectively quantifiable measurements and color palettes in its
regulation of newspaper racks.207 Knowing it would face elevated scrutiny
because of First Amendment issues, the city made sure its regulations were
tied as closely as possible to aesthetic uniformity (in terms of size, color
and typeface) and safety (requiring placement of racks away from curb cuts,
for example). That way, the city was able to prove its goals really were
aesthetics and safety and not suppression of speech.
A burden-shifting scheme for aesthetic regulations might balance the

203 F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
204 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (emphasis added).
205 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (emphasis added).
206 The presumption of validity of local ordinances is remarkably broad. See, e.g., 6 MCQUILLIN
MUN. CORP. § 20:7 (3d ed. 2013).
207 Gold Coast Publ’ns, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1346 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The Ordinance
does not completely ban newsracks from public rights-of-way or prohibit the sale and distribution of
newspapers. Similarly, publishers are permitted to display their name or logo in the color of their choice
so long as the lettering is no larger than 1 ¾ inches.”).
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interests of the government with those of plaintiffs like Kuvin. If plaintiffs
show a weak connection between the regulation and aesthetics–for example,
by showing that the law permits rusted cars but not Cadillac pickup trucks–
the burden would shift to the city to show that the law is reasonably related
to some state interest other than aesthetics. For instance, the city could
show evidence that pick-up trucks harm property values. The government
would not have to justify every aesthetic regulation, however, but only
those in which a plaintiff with proper standing is able to make a case for
irrationality. Local officials would nevertheless likely warn that the
regulation would be onerous, and only time and experience would prove
whether they are correct.208
Another way Florida could limit Berman would be to limit purely
aesthetic regulations to those designed to protect the public from the most
severe eyesores. This seems to be the law in Ohio. In that state, a land-use
regulation may be based on aesthetics only if: (1) it also has a “real and
substantial relationship” to another state interest;209 or (2) the aesthetic harm
would be “generally patent and gross, and not merely a matter of taste.”210
This latter rule would have the advantage of protecting plaintiffs like Kuvin
by exempting purely aesthetic regulations from Euclid’s “fairly debatable”
standard. In effect, the second Ohio rule says that purely aesthetic
regulations should be presumed invalid, rather than valid, if they are fairly
debatable matters of taste. But where reasonable people would not likely
disagree – as with an unfenced automobile junkyard – the regulation would
be valid.
It is difficult to imagine that any court would find “patent and gross”
aesthetic harm from a pickup truck, but an Ohio municipality might
nevertheless be able to wedge through a Coral Gables-type ordinance under
the state’s first rule, by arguing that it has a “real and substantial”
relationship to separating commercial and residential uses.
But even if the first rule were omitted, Ohio’s scheme would be
problematic. The government could simply refrain from citing aesthetics,
and instead point to property values as the basis of its regulation.
Moreover, judges would find themselves in the unenviable position of
having to decide what aesthetic harm is “patent and gross.”

208 For example, the Florida League of Cities opposed the post-Kelo state constitutional
amendment. Weimar, supra note 192, at 36.
209 Edward H. Ziegler Jr., Aesthetics in Ohio Land Use Law: Preserving Beauty in the Parlor and
Keeping Pigs in the Barnyard, 19 AKRON L. REV. 1, 32 (1985); Ghaster Props., Inc. v. Preston, 200
N.E.2d 328, 334 (Ohio 1964); Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ohio 1984) (“The
cases also reflect the thought that aesthetics is not a concern of the public health, safety or general
welfare, but is, at most, an incidental or secondary reason for enacting legislation.”).
210 Ziegler, supra note 209, at 13; State v. Buckley, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ohio 1968).
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Another option would be to adopt a balancing test that weighs the
public benefits of an aesthetic regulation against the private burdens it
creates. New York has at times employed such a rule, requiring “a proper
balance between the welfare of the public and the rights of the private
owner.”211
2. Allow Variances for Aesthetic Regulations
Strictly speaking, Coral Gables did not ban pickup trucks. As applied
to Lowell Kuvin, however, the city did ban his pickup truck because he had
no garage in which to hide it.
The courts look with disfavor on zoning regulations that create
needless hardship on individual property owners. In fact, when a land-use
regulation lacks a procedure for making an exception, known as a variance,
based on the limitations of a particular property, the regulation may be
unenforceable as applied to the particular property.212
A variance is a form of relief from a land-use regulation limited to a
single property. Variances were originally developed to help owners of
property whose topography makes it impracticable to comply with a
regulation, typically one pertaining to spacing. Because variances allow an
owner to use land that otherwise might be rendered useless, they also help
localities to avoid effecting a regulatory taking.213
The traditional standard for a variance is that complying with the
regulation would create a hardship for the landowner, and that this hardship
was not self-imposed. Increasingly, courts do not consider the fact that a
landowner bought a home after the regulation was enacted to be conclusive
proof that the hardship was self-created, even if the buyer knew of the
rule.214 However, Florida follows the old rule, which is that a variance
generally does not lie when the owner bought the property knowing of the
regulation.215 Buyers of real property are charged with constructive
knowledge of applicable zoning regulations.216 Still, a variance may be
211 Shepard v. Vill. of Skaneateles, 89 N.E.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. 1949); see also 1 N.Y. ZONING
LAW & PRAC. § 6:16 (2013).
212 E.g., Innkeepers Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 460 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citing 8 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25:50 (3d ed.
1983)).
213 The government effects a regulatory taking when it enacts a regulation that denies a
landowner all economically beneficial use of her property. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1015 (1992).
214 3 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 58:22
(4th ed. 2013).
215 Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784, 789 (Fla. 1957).
216 E.g., Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. Dist.

28 ANDRON_PUBLISHER2 (DO NOT DELETE)

114

3/13/2014 8:28 PM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 9:83

permissible if, regardless of the landowner’s improvident decision, the
property would have qualified for a variance before he bought it.217 In
Florida, the hardship should not be shared with other property owners in the
area.218
Although variances are most commonly sought by property owners, on
behalf of themselves or a prospective buyer, leaseholders also appear to
have standing to seek a variance.219
Florida does not have a statewide statutory standard that an applicant
must meet to support a variance.220 As a result, different localities have
different rules.221 Nevertheless, “Florida courts have held that a legal
hardship will be found to exist only in those cases where the property is
virtually unusable or incapable of yielding a reasonable return when used
pursuant to the applicable zoning regulations.”222

Ct. App. 1990) (“Owners are deemed to purchase property with constructive knowledge of applicable
land use regulations.”) (citing several cases establishing this rule). This rule is well-established in
Florida law, but an argument could be made that an exception should be made in the case of a purchaser
of a homestead seeking a variance from an unusual ordinance provision. The unusual ordinance
provision becomes like a surprising term in a contract of adhesion. “An additional term included in a
written confirmation is considered to be a material alteration which will not become part of the contract
if the term’s inclusion will result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without an express awareness by
the other party.” 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 155 (2014). If an ordinance provision has a term a reasonable
homebuyer would not expect, and in fact did not know about, and which other municipalities do not
have, then the buyer should be allowed to apply for a variance without being charged with constructive
knowledge of the provision. In support of this argument, note that the Florida Supreme Court has
highlighted a commercial buyer’s “full knowledge” of land-use rules in finding that a hardship was selfcreated. Autrey, 96 So. 2d at 789.
217 City of Coral Gables v. Geary, 383 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
218 Herrera v. City of Miami, 600 So. 2d 561, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Nance v.
Town of Indialantic, 419 So. 2d 1041 (Fla.1982)).
219 See, e.g., Vill. of Key Biscayne v. Dade Cnty., 627 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an aquarium operator was allowed to seek variances on leased land); Crossroads
Lounge, Inc. v. City of Miami, 195 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that a lessee was
allowed to seek variance to permit alcohol sales) (rev’d other grounds). For a national survey of who
has standing to seek a variance, see W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Zoning: who may apply for variance,
special exception, or use permit, or appeal from denial thereof, 89 A.L.R.2D 663 (1963) (“While there is
authority to the contrary, a lessee has been regarded as having sufficient standing to apply in his own
right for a zoning variance as to the leased property, or to appeal from the denial thereof.”).
220 Patricia E. Salkin, States whose statutes are silent on variances – Local jurisdictions
determine variance standards, 2 AM. LAW. ZONING § 13:13 (2013).
221 E.g., compare TOWN OF CUTLER BAY, FLA., LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS § 3-36
(“Owners of lands or structures may apply to the Town Council for a variance from the requirements or
restrictions of the Land Development Regulations; except that no variance for use or density issues shall
be considered.”) (emphasis added) with MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 33-311(A)(4)(a)
(specifying that use variances may be granted “as will not be contrary to the public interest, where
owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions thereof will result in unnecessary
hardship, and so the spirit of the regulations shall be observed and substantial justice done; provided,
that the use variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the regulation . . . .”).
222 Maturo v. City of Coral Gables, 619 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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It’s worth noting that municipalities are widely thought to misapply
variance law much of the time, and to grant or deny variances for extralegal
reasons.223 The “boards of adjustment” that commonly hear variance cases
are made up of laypeople.224 Their opinions may or may not be placed in
writing, and may not be indexed or published.225 In short:
A conventional wisdom has developed that the zoning variance is
widely abused – that it is used to quietly grant special favors to the
politically connected, that uneducated lay boards apply their peculiar
notion of justice rather than judiciously applying narrowly defined
legal standards . . . .226
In general, variances ordinarily apply to real property. But one of the
purposes of granting variances is to avoid effecting a regulatory taking, and
the takings clause “applies equally to real and personal property, including
motor vehicles.”227 Not so clear is whether a land-use regulation can effect
a taking of a motor vehicle. Several past cases have hinted that a regulation

223 E.g., Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and LandUse Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 308 (1995) (“Local
decisionmaking bodies have been found frequently to base decisions to grant or deny variances on
inappropriate and substantially irrelevant factors.”); Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power—
Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3 (1969) (“Board decisions are
frequently the product of improper considerations . . . .”).
224 For example, variance requests in the Village of Miami Shores, Fla., are heard by the village’s
Planning Board, whose members are appointed by the Village Council, with no special skills or
knowledge required. MIAMI SHORES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 8.5-70, 19-16 et seq. (2013).
225 As an example here is the entire record of a variance decision by the Miami Shores Planning
Board, as found in the board’s minutes. Meeting Minutes Miami Shores Village Planning Board (June
23,
2011),
available
at
http://miamishoresvillage.com/Planning_____Zoning/Minutes/Minutes%202011/Minutes%20PZ-11-0623.htm.

PZ 3-11-2011232
Jose Castro (Owner)
9701 Biscayne Blvd.
Article VII. Errors and Variances; Sec. 702 Hardship variances: Sec 518. Fences walls and hedges.
(a) Maximum height: (4) Variance to allow gate exceeding height limitation.
The Chairman summarized at the last hearing the applicant addressed the Board. The Board
requested the applicant to provide documentation to back up his statements.
The applicant addressed the Board and provided pictures and applied applications for fences from
his neighbors. The Board questioned the applicant about his knowledge of the surrounding homes
being historic homes. After a discussion by the board, Mr. Abramitis moved to deny this
application. Mr. Reese seconded the motion and the vote was unanimous in favor of the motion 50.
Additional background information might be available in the agenda packet, but it would shed light only
on facts and not on the board’s reasoning.
226 David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of A
Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 280 (2004).
227 In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, Altered VIN 243340M, 576 So. 2d
261, 263 (Fla. 1990).
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that entirely excludes a type of vehicle from residential districts might
effect a taking.228 Unfortunately, the language used in those decisions only
made it clear that such a regulation might be unconstitutional, without
spelling out whether the problem was a taking or over-breadth.
Kuvin might have sought a variance based on the premise that the
ordinance unfairly burdened him, and that allowing him to park his truck on
his property would have no effect on property values or aesthetics. His
home had no garage, so he could not keep his pickup truck at his home, and
comply with the city’s requirement that it be kept in a garage. He rented his
home, but even if he owned it, the cost of building a garage would likely
have exceeded the value of his vehicle, assuming such a project was even
possible given the size of his lot and city spacing regulations. Given the
age of the housing stock in Coral Gables, Kuvin might have argued that his
was a reasonable case for a variance. The city could have conditioned the
variance by limiting where he could park and requiring him to keep the
truck’s bed empty.
CONCLUSION
The theory underlying rational-basis review is that it allows individual
communities to create their own aesthetic regulations subject mainly to
political, rather than judicial, accountability. Of course, whether this
balance is satisfactory may depend on whether your ox is being gored.
The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution
protect “insular minorities” and a few other groups from discrimination, and
they provide some protection to everyone else when fundamental liberties
are implicated.
But many–perhaps most–government actions neither target minorities
nor affect such basic rights as speech or religion. In these cases, state police
power is vast, and its limits hard to define, especially under the murky law
of the rational-basis test.
The result is a case like Kuvin, which seems to defy common
expectations of what the government can or can’t do. Surely it can’t tell us
what kind of car we can drive, or whether we can park it in our own
driveway?
As this paper shows, the answer depends on how judges see the limits
of the police power under rational-basis scrutiny. If courts apply the test in
228 E.g., City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that the prohibition on parking campers in a residential district was reasonable in light of the exception
allowing them in garages); Proctor v. City of Coral Springs, 396 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (distinguishing Wood from other cases, saying “[s]torage of the vehicles was permitted within a
garage or other structure, and therefore the ordinance did not unconstitutionally deprive the owners of a
right to have camper-type vehicles”).
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its simplest terms, Kuvin loses because laws of debatable rationality must
be upheld.
But cases like Romer, Cleburne, Moreno, Carter, and Kayfetz suggest
that state actions on the edge of rationality may call for a more nuanced
approach. While stopping short of substituting their judgment for that of
the legislature, courts must consider whether (1) the state action is
motivated by irrational animus, and (2) whether the state seeks to ban some
ordinary and harmless activity.
On the other hand, these arguments will not sway every judge, at least
as applied to Lowell Kuvin’s pickup truck. If that’s the case, then a change
or clarification in the law may be needed to define the outermost limits of
the state’s power to regulate aesthetics.
Otherwise, many courts may find ordinances like that of Coral Gables
acceptable because, as Justice Thurgood Marshall was fond of saying,
“[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid
laws.”229

229 New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia wrote that “[p]arty conventions, with their attendant
‘smoke-filled rooms’ and domination by party leaders, have long been an accepted manner of selecting
party candidates . . . . While a State may determine it is not desirable and replace it, it is not
unconstitutional.” Id. at 206-07 (upholding New York State’s byzantine system of allowing politicalparty delegates to select judicial candidates).

